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Authorization bypass when combining organization, billing, or reverification checks

High
nikosdouvlis published GHSA-w24r-5266-9c3c Apr 22, 2026

Package

npm @clerk/astro (npm)

Affected versions

>= 2.0.0, <= 2.17.10
>= 3.0.0, <= 3.0.17

Patched versions

2.17.11
3.0.18
npm @clerk/backend (npm)
>= 2.0.0, <= 2.33.2
>= 3.0.0, <= 3.2.13
2.33.3
3.2.14
npm @clerk/chrome-extension (npm)
>= 1.3.5, <= 2.9.14
>= 3.0.0, <= 3.1.14
2.9.15
3.1.15
npm @clerk/clerk-expo (npm)
>= 2.2.11, <= 2.19.35
2.19.36
npm @clerk/clerk-js (npm)
>= 5.22.0, <= 5.125.9
>= 6.0.0, <= 6.7.4
5.125.10
6.7.5
npm @clerk/clerk-react (npm)
>= 5.9.0, <= 5.61.5
5.61.6
npm @clerk/expo (npm)
>= 3.0.0, <= 3.2.1
3.2.2
npm @clerk/express (npm)
>= 0.1.0, <= 1.7.78
>= 2.0.0, <= 2.1.5
1.7.79
2.1.6
npm @clerk/fastify (npm)
>= 1.0.42, <= 2.6.30
>= 3.0.0, <= 3.1.15
2.6.31
3.1.16
npm @clerk/hono (npm)
>= 0.0.2, <= 0.1.15
0.1.16
npm @clerk/nextjs (npm)
>= 6.0.0, <= 6.39.2
>= 7.0.0, <= 7.2.3
6.39.3
7.2.4
npm @clerk/nuxt (npm)
>= 1.0.0, <= 1.13.28
>= 2.0.0, <= 2.2.4
1.13.29
2.2.5
npm @clerk/react (npm)
>= 6.0.0, <= 6.4.2
6.4.3
npm @clerk/react-router (npm)
>= 0.0.1, <= 2.4.12
>= 3.0.0, <= 3.1.3
2.4.13
3.1.4
npm @clerk/shared (npm)
>= 3.0.0, <= 3.47.4
>= 4.0.0, <= 4.8.2
3.47.5
4.8.3
npm @clerk/tanstack-react-start (npm)
>= 0.0.1, <= 0.29.10
>= 1.0.0, <= 1.1.3
0.29.11
1.1.4
npm @clerk/vue (npm)
>= 1.0.0, <= 1.17.20
>= 2.0.0, <= 2.0.15
1.17.21
2.0.16

Description

Summary

has(), auth.protect(), and related authorization predicates in @clerk/shared, @clerk/nextjs, @clerk/backend, and other framework SDKs can return true for certain combined authorization checks when the result should be false, allowing a gated action to proceed for a user who does not satisfy the full set of requested conditions.

Sessions are not compromised and no existing user can be impersonated. The bypass is limited to the authorization decision returned by the predicate. clerkMiddleware continues to authenticate requests correctly, auth() reflects the real authentication state, and token verification is unaffected.

Who is affected

All apps that combine more than one authorization dimension in a single has() or auth.protect() call should upgrade to the patched versions. Patches are drop-in with no API changes. The information below describes the scope of the bypass and helps you understand whether you are potentially affected, but is not a reason to delay the upgrade.

This call shape can be bypassed if certain conditions are met: a has() or auth.protect() call that combines a reverification check with any of role, permission, feature, or plan, or that combines a billing check (feature or plan) with a role or permission check.

// Reverification combined with role / permission / feature / plan
await auth.protect({ permission: 'org:settings:delete', reverification: 'strict' });
const canAct = has({ role: 'org:admin', reverification: 'strict' });

// Billing (feature / plan) combined with role / permission
const canAct = has({ permission: 'org:admin', feature: 'premium' });

Single-condition checks are not affected and continue to fail closed as expected:

await auth.protect({ permission: 'org:settings:delete' });
has({ reverification: 'strict' });

The callback form of auth.protect is not affected unless the callback itself invokes one of the affected shapes:

await auth.protect(has => has({ permission: 'org:X' }) && has({ reverification: 'strict' }));

App patterns that rely only on single-condition checks, or that combine them via the callback form, are unaffected. Authentication, session state, and token verification continue to work correctly regardless of this bypass.

@clerk/shared is usually not imported directly in application code, but the fix lives there and reaches your app through your framework package. If you import createCheckAuthorization from @clerk/shared directly, you are also affected. Run npm why @clerk/shared (or your package manager's equivalent) to check your installed version.

Additional auth.protect() bypass

A second, related bypass lives in @clerk/nextjs: auth.protect() silently discarded authorization params (role, permission, feature, plan, reverification) whenever the same argument object also contained unauthenticatedUrl, unauthorizedUrl, or token.

Recommended actions

Upgrade to the latest patch release of your framework package on your current major. Both Core 2 and Core 3 release lines have patches. See the "Affected packages" section above for the exact vulnerable ranges and patched versions per package.

If you pin @clerk/clerk-js directly, upgrade it to the patched version. Most apps load @clerk/clerk-js from Clerk's CDN through their framework package and will receive the fix automatically, with no upgrade step required.

Workaround

If you cannot upgrade immediately, split combined has() or auth.protect() calls into sequential single-condition checks:

// Replace
await auth.protect({ permission: 'org:X', reverification: 'strict' });
// With
await auth.protect({ reverification: 'strict' });
await auth.protect({ permission: 'org:X' });

Each single-condition check fails closed as expected, so evaluating them independently and denying if either fails produces the correct result.

Timeline

This issue was reported on 18 APR 2026, patched on 22 APR 2026, and publicly disclosed on 22 APR 2026.

Thanks to AISafe for the responsible disclosure of this vulnerability.

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required Low
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity High
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVE ID

No known CVE

Weaknesses

Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions

The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product. Learn more on MITRE.

Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. Learn more on MITRE.
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