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This repository was archived by the owner on May 31, 2021. It is now read-only.
From a security point of view, it would be very nice to be able to restrict all torrent downloads to be within a folder, e.g. /var/data
Expected Behavior
There should be a configuration option where you can set a parent folder. Users can then only download to this folder and subfolders within it.
Current Behavior
You can download to any directory on the machine.
Context
Right now, you can download torrents to any directory the user rtorrent is running as has access to. This allows all users of flood to create or overwrite arbitrarily named files in arbitrary folders which is a security nightmare. It depends on the actual setup, but there are many ways this could be abused to get full access on the server. Here are some examples:
create a cronjob in /etc/cron.d that spawns a shell
add any ssh key to /home/$USER/.ssh/authorized_keys and login over ssh
overwrite /home/$USER/.bashrc to execute commands on the next login of the user
overwrite code of flood itself which will execute the next time it is restarted
At the very least, the README should contain a warning that any user of flood can most likely also get full access to the server. This might not be immediately obvious to some.
From a security point of view, it would be very nice to be able to restrict all torrent downloads to be within a folder, e.g. /var/data
Expected Behavior
There should be a configuration option where you can set a parent folder. Users can then only download to this folder and subfolders within it.
Current Behavior
You can download to any directory on the machine.
Context
Right now, you can download torrents to any directory the user rtorrent is running as has access to. This allows all users of flood to create or overwrite arbitrarily named files in arbitrary folders which is a security nightmare. It depends on the actual setup, but there are many ways this could be abused to get full access on the server. Here are some examples:
At the very least, the README should contain a warning that any user of flood can most likely also get full access to the server. This might not be immediately obvious to some.