Summary
A low-privileged authenticated user of filebrowser (with create + delete permissions in their own isolated scope) can silently destroy share-link records belonging to any other user — including the administrator — by performing a legitimate DELETE on a file in their own directory whose logical path happens to be a byte-prefix of another user's stored share.Link.Path. The file contents of the victim are not exposed, but the victim's share links are irrevocably wiped.
Details
resourceDeleteHandler in http/resource.go cleans up any share records that reference a deleted file by calling:
// http/resource.go
err = d.store.Share.DeleteWithPathPrefix(file.Path)
file.Path here is the logical path from the URL of the deleting user's request (e.g. /a), not the absolute filesystem path. It is passed as-is to the bolt backend:
// storage/bolt/share.go
func (s shareBackend) DeleteWithPathPrefix(pathPrefix string) error {
var links []share.Link
if err := s.db.Prefix("Path", pathPrefix, &links); err != nil {
return err
}
for _, link := range links {
err = errors.Join(err, s.db.DeleteStruct(&share.Link{Hash: link.Hash}))
}
return err
}
Why the design contradicts this behavior. share.Link carries a UserID field and the application elsewhere treats shares as per-user owned resources. shareDeleteHandler explicitly enforces link.UserID != d.user.ID && !d.user.Perm.Admin → 403. The file-deletion side-effect path is the only location that bypasses this rule.
Impact
- Integrity: unauthorized deletion of share-link metadata belonging to arbitrary users, including administrators.
- Availability: effective denial-of-service of the share-link feature — a cooperating (or malicious) low-priv user can wipe the bulk of existing share links by iterating a short set of one- and two-character prefixes.
References
Summary
A low-privileged authenticated user of filebrowser (with
create+deletepermissions in their own isolated scope) can silently destroy share-link records belonging to any other user — including the administrator — by performing a legitimate DELETE on a file in their own directory whose logical path happens to be a byte-prefix of another user's storedshare.Link.Path. The file contents of the victim are not exposed, but the victim's share links are irrevocably wiped.Details
resourceDeleteHandlerinhttp/resource.gocleans up any share records that reference a deleted file by calling:file.Pathhere is the logical path from the URL of the deleting user's request (e.g./a), not the absolute filesystem path. It is passed as-is to the bolt backend:Why the design contradicts this behavior.
share.Linkcarries aUserIDfield and the application elsewhere treats shares as per-user owned resources.shareDeleteHandlerexplicitly enforceslink.UserID != d.user.ID && !d.user.Perm.Admin → 403. The file-deletion side-effect path is the only location that bypasses this rule.Impact
References