Several Net::IMAP commands accept a "raw data" argument that is sent verbatim after validation to prevent command injection. However, if a server does not support non-synchronizing literals, it may still be possible to inject arbitrary IMAP commands inside non-synchronizing literals.
Details
Raw data arguments support embedded literal values, both synchronizing and non-synchronizing. Non-synchronizing literals can only be safely sent when the server advertises any of the LITERAL+, LITERAL-, or IMAP4rev2 capabilities. But raw data arguments do not verify server support for non-synchronizing literals prior to sending.
Servers without support for non-synchronizing literals could handle them in several different ways: If a server sees a "}\r\n" byte sequence but can't parse the literal bytesize, it may cautiously decide to close the connection, blocking any command injection attacks. However, a server without support for non-synchronizing literals may instead interpret the "+}\r\n" as the end of a malformed command line and respond with a tagged BAD. In that case, the contents of the literal will be interpreted as one or more new pipelined commands, allowing a CRLF command injection attack to succeed.
This affects the following commands' string arguments:
criteria for #search and #uid_search
search_keys for #sort, #thread, #uid_sort, and #uid_thread
attr for #fetch and #uid_fetch
Prior to net-imap v0.6.4, v0.5.14, and v0.4.24, raw data arguments were not validated in any way, so they were also vulnerable to this attack. See CVE-2026-42257 (GHSA-hm49-wcqc-g2xg).
Impact
Fortunately, LITERAL- is supported by most modern IMAP servers. Even without support for non-synchronizing literals, cautious servers may handle invalid literal bytesize by closing the connection . However, servers which handle a non-synchronizing literal just like any other malformed command will enable this vulnerability.
If a developer passes an unvalidated user-controlled input for one of these method arguments, an attacker can append CRLF sequence followed by a new IMAP command (like DELETE mailbox). Although this does not directly enable data exfiltration, it could be combined with other attack vectors or knowledge of the target system's attributes, e.g.: shared mail folders or the application's installed response handlers.
Mitigation
Update to a version of net-imap which validates server support for non-synchronizing literals before sending them.
If upgrading net-imap is not possible:
- Explicitly validate user-controlled inputs to prevent embedded non-synchronizing literals unless the server supports them.
- For a simpler, more cautious approach: all embedded literals can be unconditionally prohibited, by checking that string inputs do not contain any CR or LF bytes.
- Verify that the server advertises any of the
LITERAL+, LITERAL-, or IMAP4rev2 capabilities before using untrusted string inputs for the affected "raw data" arguments.
References
Several Net::IMAP commands accept a "raw data" argument that is sent verbatim after validation to prevent command injection. However, if a server does not support non-synchronizing literals, it may still be possible to inject arbitrary IMAP commands inside non-synchronizing literals.
Details
Raw data arguments support embedded literal values, both synchronizing and non-synchronizing. Non-synchronizing literals can only be safely sent when the server advertises any of the
LITERAL+,LITERAL-, orIMAP4rev2capabilities. But raw data arguments do not verify server support for non-synchronizing literals prior to sending.Servers without support for non-synchronizing literals could handle them in several different ways: If a server sees a
"}\r\n"byte sequence but can't parse the literal bytesize, it may cautiously decide to close the connection, blocking any command injection attacks. However, a server without support for non-synchronizing literals may instead interpret the"+}\r\n"as the end of a malformed command line and respond with a taggedBAD. In that case, the contents of the literal will be interpreted as one or more new pipelined commands, allowing a CRLF command injection attack to succeed.This affects the following commands' string arguments:
criteriafor#searchand#uid_searchsearch_keysfor#sort,#thread,#uid_sort, and#uid_threadattrfor#fetchand#uid_fetchPrior to
net-imapv0.6.4, v0.5.14, and v0.4.24, raw data arguments were not validated in any way, so they were also vulnerable to this attack. See CVE-2026-42257 (GHSA-hm49-wcqc-g2xg).Impact
Fortunately,
LITERAL-is supported by most modern IMAP servers. Even without support for non-synchronizing literals, cautious servers may handle invalid literal bytesize by closing the connection . However, servers which handle a non-synchronizing literal just like any other malformed command will enable this vulnerability.If a developer passes an unvalidated user-controlled input for one of these method arguments, an attacker can append CRLF sequence followed by a new IMAP command (like DELETE mailbox). Although this does not directly enable data exfiltration, it could be combined with other attack vectors or knowledge of the target system's attributes, e.g.: shared mail folders or the application's installed response handlers.
Mitigation
Update to a version of
net-imapwhich validates server support for non-synchronizing literals before sending them.If upgrading
net-imapis not possible:LITERAL+,LITERAL-, orIMAP4rev2capabilities before using untrusted string inputs for the affected "raw data" arguments.References