When sed is invoked with both -i (in-place edit) and -...
Low severity
Unreviewed
Published
Apr 20, 2026
to the GitHub Advisory Database
•
Updated May 19, 2026
Description
Published by the National Vulnerability Database
Apr 20, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
Apr 20, 2026
Last updated
May 19, 2026
When sed is invoked with both -i (in-place edit) and --follow-symlinks, the function open_next_file() performs two separate, non-atomic filesystem operations on the same path:
Between these two calls there is a race window. If an attacker atomically replaces the symlink with a different target during that window, sed will: read content from the new (attacker-chosen) symlink target and write the processed result to the path recorded in step 1. This can lead to arbitrary file overwrite with attacker-controlled content in the context of the sed process.
This issue was fixed in version 4.10.
References