Summary
dynoxide's MCP HTTP transport was vulnerable to DNS rebinding via its transitive rmcp dependency, plus a related cross-origin CSRF gap. A malicious web page could make the user's browser send requests to a local dynoxide mcp --http or dynoxide serve --mcp server with a non-loopback Host header, which the server would then process. Affects 0.9.3 to 0.9.12. The stdio transport (dynoxide mcp without --http, which is the default) is not affected.
Impact
If a user is running dynoxide mcp --http (or dynoxide serve --mcp) on their machine and then visits a malicious web page, the attacker's JavaScript can call any MCP tool exposed by the running dynoxide instance.
Reachable tools include reads (get_item, query, scan, batch_get_item, describe_table, list_tables) and writes (put_item, update_item, delete_item, create_table, batch_write_item).
Any data in tables that the local dynoxide instance has access to can be read, modified, or destroyed.
Patches
dynoxide 0.9.13 closes both the named CVE and a related cross-origin CSRF gap:
-
DNS rebinding (the named CVE). rmcp is upgraded from 1.1.1 to 1.6.0. rmcp 1.4+ ships a default Host-header allowlist (["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"]) which rejects requests carrying any other Host header with a 403.
-
Defence in depth. Explicit allowed_hosts and allowed_origins lists are now set on StreamableHttpServerConfig directly. The Host allowlist protects against a future rmcp default flip. The Origin allowlist closes a related cross-origin CSRF gap that the Host check alone does not address: a malicious page could fetch the loopback endpoint with mode: 'no-cors', the Host header would match (it's the literal loopback address the browser is connecting to), but the Origin header would otherwise have been unchecked.
Native MCP clients that don't send an Origin header (Claude Code, Cursor, the dynoxide CLI) are unaffected by the Origin check and continue to work.
Workarounds
- Upgrade to dynoxide 0.9.13.
- If upgrade is not immediately possible: do not run the MCP HTTP transport. Run
dynoxide mcp (stdio, the default) instead of dynoxide mcp --http, and don't pass --mcp to dynoxide serve.
Resources
Credits
Vulnerability identified via GitHub Dependabot alert on the transitive rmcp dependency.
References
Summary
dynoxide's MCP HTTP transport was vulnerable to DNS rebinding via its transitive
rmcpdependency, plus a related cross-origin CSRF gap. A malicious web page could make the user's browser send requests to a localdynoxide mcp --httpordynoxide serve --mcpserver with a non-loopbackHostheader, which the server would then process. Affects 0.9.3 to 0.9.12. The stdio transport (dynoxide mcpwithout--http, which is the default) is not affected.Impact
If a user is running
dynoxide mcp --http(ordynoxide serve --mcp) on their machine and then visits a malicious web page, the attacker's JavaScript can call any MCP tool exposed by the running dynoxide instance.Reachable tools include reads (
get_item,query,scan,batch_get_item,describe_table,list_tables) and writes (put_item,update_item,delete_item,create_table,batch_write_item).Any data in tables that the local dynoxide instance has access to can be read, modified, or destroyed.
Patches
dynoxide 0.9.13 closes both the named CVE and a related cross-origin CSRF gap:
DNS rebinding (the named CVE).
rmcpis upgraded from 1.1.1 to 1.6.0. rmcp 1.4+ ships a default Host-header allowlist (["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"]) which rejects requests carrying any other Host header with a 403.Defence in depth. Explicit
allowed_hostsandallowed_originslists are now set onStreamableHttpServerConfigdirectly. The Host allowlist protects against a future rmcp default flip. The Origin allowlist closes a related cross-origin CSRF gap that the Host check alone does not address: a malicious page couldfetchthe loopback endpoint withmode: 'no-cors', the Host header would match (it's the literal loopback address the browser is connecting to), but the Origin header would otherwise have been unchecked.Native MCP clients that don't send an Origin header (Claude Code, Cursor, the dynoxide CLI) are unaffected by the Origin check and continue to work.
Workarounds
dynoxide mcp(stdio, the default) instead ofdynoxide mcp --http, and don't pass--mcptodynoxide serve.Resources
Credits
Vulnerability identified via GitHub Dependabot alert on the transitive rmcp dependency.
References