Summary
The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from servedir.
Due to the use of path.Clean() (which only normalizes forward-slash / separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (\) that bypass the intended directory containment logic. An attacker can escape the configured servedir root and access arbitrary files on the filesystem.
This issue affects Windows environments only.
Details
The request path is sanitized using:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
However:
path.Clean() is POSIX-style and only understands / (docs: https://pkg.go.dev/path#Clean)
- On Windows,
\ is a valid path separator
path.Clean() does not treat \ as a separator
Later, the server constructs the absolute path:
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L221
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
If queryPath contains sequences such as:
..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini
path.Clean() will not normalize them, but the Windows filesystem will interpret \ as directory separators when resolving absPath.
Because the implementation does not verify that the final resolved path remains within servedir, it allows directory traversal outside the intended root directory.
Vulnerable Code
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
....
// Check for a file in the "servedir" directory
if h.servedir != "" && kind != fs.FileEntry {
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
if absDir := h.fs.Dir(absPath); absDir != absPath {
if entries, err, _ := h.fs.ReadDirectory(absDir); err == nil {
if entry, _ := entries.Get(h.fs.Base(absPath)); entry != nil && entry.Kind(h.fs) == fs.FileEntry {
....
Steps to reproduce
npm install --save-exact --save-dev esbuild
echo "console.log(1)" > app.js
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild --version
0.27.3
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild app.js --bundle --outdir=www --servedir=www --watch
curl -i --path-as-is "http://localhost:8000/..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini"
<content of Windows\system.ini>
Impact
- Arbitrary file read on Windows
- Exposure of sensitive files
References
Summary
The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from
servedir.Due to the use of
path.Clean()(which only normalizes forward-slash/separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (\) that bypass the intended directory containment logic. An attacker can escape the configuredservedirroot and access arbitrary files on the filesystem.This issue affects Windows environments only.
Details
The request path is sanitized using:
However:
path.Clean()is POSIX-style and only understands/(docs:https://pkg.go.dev/path#Clean)\is a valid path separatorpath.Clean()does not treat\as a separatorLater, the server constructs the absolute path:
If
queryPathcontains sequences such as:path.Clean()will not normalize them, but the Windows filesystem will interpret\as directory separators when resolvingabsPath.Because the implementation does not verify that the final resolved path remains within
servedir, it allows directory traversal outside the intended root directory.Vulnerable Code
Steps to reproduce
Impact
References