Summary
A critical SQL injection vulnerability in Saltcorn’s mobile-sync routes allows any authenticated low-privilege user with read access to at least one table to inject arbitrary SQL through sync parameters. This can lead to full database exfiltration, including admin password hashes and configuration secrets, and may also enable database modification or destruction depending on the backend.
Details
The issue affects the mobile-sync endpoints:
POST /sync/load_changesPOST /sync/deletes
According to the provided analysis, user-controlled values from the request body are interpolated directly into SQL template literals without parameterization, type enforcement, or sanitization. In particular, req.body.syncInfos[tableName].maxLoadedId is embedded into SQL in getSyncRows() and timestamp-derived values are similarly interpolated in getDelRows().
Relevant vulnerable code paths include:
packages/server/routes/sync.js — getSyncRows()
- branch using
where data_tbl."${db.sqlsanitize(pkName)}" > ${syncInfo.maxLoadedId}
- branch using
and info_tbl.ref > ${syncInfo.maxLoadedId}
packages/server/routes/sync.js — getDelRows()
- timestamp expressions built from request-controlled values and inserted into SQL
packages/server/routes/sync.js — /load_changes route handler
- request body fields are passed into the SQL-building functions without validation or safe binding
The root cause is that values are treated as trusted SQL fragments rather than bound parameters. While db.sqlsanitize() is used for identifiers elsewhere, that does not protect interpolated values and is not intended to prevent value-based SQL injection. The report notes there is no parseInt(), numeric validation, or prepared-statement binding before these values are concatenated into the query string.
This means a normal authenticated user can escape the intended query logic and execute arbitrary SQL in the context of the application database. The provided evidence demonstrates successful extraction of user records and schema information through the vulnerable sync route, confirming that the injection is practically exploitable.
PoC
Based on the provided report, the issue can be reproduced by authenticating as a normal user, sending a crafted request to the affected sync endpoint, and placing a malicious SQL expression into the sync metadata field that is later interpolated into the backend query. Successful exploitation returns attacker-selected database contents in the sync response.
Impact
- Type: SQL injection
- Who is impacted: Any Saltcorn deployment exposing the affected mobile-sync routes to authenticated users
- Security impact: An authenticated low-privilege user may exfiltrate the full database, including password hashes, configuration secrets, application data, and schema information; on some backends, the same flaw may also permit writes, schema changes, or destructive operations
- Attack preconditions: The attacker needs a valid authenticated account with access to at least one readable table through the sync feature
- Privilege impact: The issue allows escalation from normal user access to database-wide compromise
References
QiaoNPC Reporter
Summary
A critical SQL injection vulnerability in Saltcorn’s mobile-sync routes allows any authenticated low-privilege user with read access to at least one table to inject arbitrary SQL through sync parameters. This can lead to full database exfiltration, including admin password hashes and configuration secrets, and may also enable database modification or destruction depending on the backend.
Details
The issue affects the mobile-sync endpoints:
POST /sync/load_changesPOST /sync/deletesAccording to the provided analysis, user-controlled values from the request body are interpolated directly into SQL template literals without parameterization, type enforcement, or sanitization. In particular,
req.body.syncInfos[tableName].maxLoadedIdis embedded into SQL ingetSyncRows()and timestamp-derived values are similarly interpolated ingetDelRows().Relevant vulnerable code paths include:
packages/server/routes/sync.js—getSyncRows()where data_tbl."${db.sqlsanitize(pkName)}" > ${syncInfo.maxLoadedId}and info_tbl.ref > ${syncInfo.maxLoadedId}packages/server/routes/sync.js—getDelRows()packages/server/routes/sync.js—/load_changesroute handlerThe root cause is that values are treated as trusted SQL fragments rather than bound parameters. While
db.sqlsanitize()is used for identifiers elsewhere, that does not protect interpolated values and is not intended to prevent value-based SQL injection. The report notes there is noparseInt(), numeric validation, or prepared-statement binding before these values are concatenated into the query string.This means a normal authenticated user can escape the intended query logic and execute arbitrary SQL in the context of the application database. The provided evidence demonstrates successful extraction of user records and schema information through the vulnerable sync route, confirming that the injection is practically exploitable.
PoC
Based on the provided report, the issue can be reproduced by authenticating as a normal user, sending a crafted request to the affected sync endpoint, and placing a malicious SQL expression into the sync metadata field that is later interpolated into the backend query. Successful exploitation returns attacker-selected database contents in the sync response.
Impact
References