Impact
Nuxt's globally registered <NoScript> component (from @unhead/vue head components, re-exported by Nuxt) wrote its default-slot content to the innerHTML of the <noscript> head tag, bypassing the HTML escaping that {{ }} interpolation normally applies in Vue templates.
Applications that placed untrusted, attacker-controllable data inside a <NoScript> slot, for example:
<NoScript>{{ route.query.banner }}</NoScript>
would emit that value unescaped inside <noscript> in the server-rendered HTML. With scripting enabled, the HTML parser treats <noscript> content in <head> under the "in head noscript" insertion mode: any tag other than link, meta, noframes, or style implicitly closes <noscript> and is re-processed in the head. A payload such as <script>...</script> therefore escapes the element and executes in the document context.
Sibling head components (<Style>, <Title>) were not affected because they already routed slot text through the safe textContent path.
Affected versions
All currently supported versions of nuxt that ship the <NoScript> global component.
Patches
Fixed in nuxt@4.4.7 (commit 4b054e9d) and backported to nuxt@3.21.7 (commit 7fea9fd6). The fix escapes <NoScript> slot content with escapeHtml from @vue/shared and writes it to textContent rather than innerHTML. Slot content is now rendered as text; intentional markup inside <NoScript> is no longer parsed as HTML.
Workarounds
Until you can upgrade:
- Do not interpolate untrusted input into
<NoScript> slots. Replace <NoScript>{{ x }}</NoScript> with a static string, or sanitise / HTML-escape x at the source.
- If you must render dynamic noscript content, write the tag yourself via
useHead({ noscript: [{ textContent: escapedValue }] }) after escaping escapedValue.
Credit
Reported to Anthropic's coordinated vulnerability disclosure pipeline by Claude (Anthropic's AI assistant) and triaged by the Anthropic security team. Reference: ANT-2026-4NJYDFFM.
Independently reported by @alcls01111 via GitHub's coordinated disclosure flow (GHSA-8grp-wcq9-925q), closed as a duplicate of this advisory.
References
Impact
Nuxt's globally registered
<NoScript>component (from@unhead/vuehead components, re-exported by Nuxt) wrote its default-slot content to theinnerHTMLof the<noscript>head tag, bypassing the HTML escaping that{{ }}interpolation normally applies in Vue templates.Applications that placed untrusted, attacker-controllable data inside a
<NoScript>slot, for example:would emit that value unescaped inside
<noscript>in the server-rendered HTML. With scripting enabled, the HTML parser treats<noscript>content in<head>under the "in head noscript" insertion mode: any tag other thanlink,meta,noframes, orstyleimplicitly closes<noscript>and is re-processed in the head. A payload such as<script>...</script>therefore escapes the element and executes in the document context.Sibling head components (
<Style>,<Title>) were not affected because they already routed slot text through the safetextContentpath.Affected versions
All currently supported versions of
nuxtthat ship the<NoScript>global component.Patches
Fixed in
nuxt@4.4.7(commit4b054e9d) and backported tonuxt@3.21.7(commit7fea9fd6). The fix escapes<NoScript>slot content withescapeHtmlfrom@vue/sharedand writes it totextContentrather thaninnerHTML. Slot content is now rendered as text; intentional markup inside<NoScript>is no longer parsed as HTML.Workarounds
Until you can upgrade:
<NoScript>slots. Replace<NoScript>{{ x }}</NoScript>with a static string, or sanitise / HTML-escapexat the source.useHead({ noscript: [{ textContent: escapedValue }] })after escapingescapedValue.Credit
Reported to Anthropic's coordinated vulnerability disclosure pipeline by Claude (Anthropic's AI assistant) and triaged by the Anthropic security team. Reference: ANT-2026-4NJYDFFM.
Independently reported by @alcls01111 via GitHub's coordinated disclosure flow (
GHSA-8grp-wcq9-925q), closed as a duplicate of this advisory.References