update to go1.26.4#13828
Conversation
This release include 3 security fixes following the security policy:
- mime: quadratic complexity in WordDecoder.DecodeHeader
Decoding a maliciously-crafted MIME header containing many invalid
encoded-words could consume excessive CPU.
The MIME decoder now better handles this case.
Thanks to p4p3r (https://hackerone.com/p4p3r_hak) for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2026-42504 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/79217.
- net/textproto: arbitrary input are included in errors without any escaping
When returning errors, functions in the net/textproto package would
include its input as part of the error, without any escaping. Note that
said input is often controlled by external parties when using this
package naturally. For example, a net/http client uses ReadMIMEHeader
when parsing the headers it receive from a server.
As a result, an attacker could inject arbitrary content into the error.
Practically, this can result in an attacker injecting misleading
content, terminal control bytes, etc. into a victim's output or logs.
This is CVE-2026-42507 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/79346
- crypto/x509: split candidate hostname only once
(*x509.Certificate).VerifyHostname previously called matchHostnames in a loop
over all DNS Subject Alternative Name (SAN) entries. This caused
strings.Split(host, ".") to execute repeatedly on the same input hostname.
With a large DNS SAN list, verification costs scaled quadratically based on the
number of SAN entries multiplied by the hostname's label count. Because
x509.Verify validates hostnames before building the certificate chain, this
overhead occurred even for untrusted certificates.
Thanks to Jakub Ciolek (https://ciolek.dev) for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2026-27145 and https://go.dev/issue/79694.
View the release notes for more information:
https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.26.4
Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
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Pull request overview
Updates the repository’s Go toolchain pin to Go 1.26.4, aligning local development, CI (via .go-version), and the build container base image with the latest patch release that includes the security fixes referenced in the PR description.
Changes:
- Bump Go version in the build Dockerfile from 1.26.3 → 1.26.4.
- Bump the repo-wide Go version file
.go-versionfrom 1.26.3 → 1.26.4.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 2 out of 2 changed files in this pull request and generated no comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
Dockerfile |
Updates GO_VERSION build arg to use Go 1.26.4 in the build image. |
.go-version |
Updates the Go version consumed by CI (actions/setup-go via go-version-file). |
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Assessment: 🟢 APPROVE
This PR updates the Go toolchain from go1.26.3 to go1.26.4 — a security patch release addressing three CVEs:
- CVE-2026-42504: quadratic complexity in
mime.WordDecoder.DecodeHeader - CVE-2026-42507: unescaped input in
net/textprotoerror messages - CVE-2026-27145: quadratic cost in
crypto/x509hostname verification
Both changed files (.go-version and Dockerfile) are updated consistently to 1.26.4. The bump follows the same incremental pattern as all prior patch updates in the file history. No logic errors, no version mismatches, no issues found.
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. 📢 Thoughts on this report? Let us know! |
This release include 3 security fixes following the security policy:
mime: quadratic complexity in WordDecoder.DecodeHeader
Decoding a maliciously-crafted MIME header containing many invalid
encoded-words could consume excessive CPU.
The MIME decoder now better handles this case.
Thanks to p4p3r (https://hackerone.com/p4p3r_hak) for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2026-42504 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/79217.
net/textproto: arbitrary input are included in errors without any escaping
When returning errors, functions in the net/textproto package would
include its input as part of the error, without any escaping. Note that
said input is often controlled by external parties when using this
package naturally. For example, a net/http client uses ReadMIMEHeader
when parsing the headers it receive from a server.
As a result, an attacker could inject arbitrary content into the error.
Practically, this can result in an attacker injecting misleading
content, terminal control bytes, etc. into a victim's output or logs.
This is CVE-2026-42507 and Go issue https://go.dev/issue/79346
crypto/x509: split candidate hostname only once
(*x509.Certificate).VerifyHostname previously called matchHostnames in a loop
over all DNS Subject Alternative Name (SAN) entries. This caused
strings.Split(host, ".") to execute repeatedly on the same input hostname.
With a large DNS SAN list, verification costs scaled quadratically based on the
number of SAN entries multiplied by the hostname's label count. Because
x509.Verify validates hostnames before building the certificate chain, this
overhead occurred even for untrusted certificates.
Thanks to Jakub Ciolek (https://ciolek.dev) for reporting this issue.
This is CVE-2026-27145 and https://go.dev/issue/79694.
View the release notes for more information:
https://go.dev/doc/devel/release#go1.26.4
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