[FCE-3227] Fix DTLS fingerprint not being validated in certain cases#250
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Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## master #250 +/- ##
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+ Coverage 88.01% 88.14% +0.13%
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Files 59 59
Lines 2836 2834 -2
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+ Hits 2496 2498 +2
+ Misses 340 336 -4
... and 1 file with indirect coverage changes Continue to review full report in Codecov by Sentry.
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Karolk99
approved these changes
May 4, 2026
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Released 0.15.1 and 0.16.1. Advisory available here |
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This is a bugfix for a vulnerability found by @songxpu
As stated in the issue #249, when
ExDTLSreturned:handshake_finishedwith no packets, the actual peer fingerprint was not validated to match the one passed in the SDP offer/answer. Skipping this check is presumed to allow man-in-the-middle attacks which hijack the DTLS key exchange process and could therefore compromise the E2E encryption of the media being sent.After this PR is merged, I recommend:
0.15.1,0.16.10.15.0,0.16.0Additional research is needed to confirm the severity of this vulnerability, which was reported as critical